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Single Idea 22897

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series ]

Full Idea

In the dynamic theory of time the Battle of Waterloo is become more past. If we insist on the A-series properties, this seems inevitable. But how can a past event be changing now?

Gist of Idea

The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that?

Source

Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 4 'Reasons')

Book Ref

Bardon,Adrian: 'Brief History of the Philosophy of Time' [OUP 2013], p.84

A Reaction

[He cites Ulrich Meyer for this] We don't worry about an object changing its position when it is swept down a river. The location of the Battle of Waterloo relative to 'now' is not a property of the battle. That is a 'Cambridge' property.

The 24 ideas from 'Brief History of the Philosophy of Time'

22889 We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon]
22883 It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon]
22882 We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon]
22886 The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon]
22884 The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon]
22890 We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon]
22892 Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon]
22901 The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon]
22902 Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon]
22900 How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon]
22898 What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon]
22897 The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon]
22896 The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon]
22910 To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon]
22909 We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon]
22904 The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon]
22906 The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon]
22907 It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon]
22905 Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon]
22903 The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon]
22911 At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon]
22912 Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon]
22914 An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon]
22913 The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon]